Must a Faithful Judge Be a Faithless Judge? by O\u27Scannlain, Diarmuid F.
University of St. Thomas Law Journal
Volume 4
Issue 2 Fall 2006 Article 1
2006
Must a Faithful Judge Be a Faithless Judge?
Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain
This Keynote Address is brought to you for free and open access by UST Research Online and the University of St. Thomas Law Journal. For more
information, please contact lawjournal@stthomas.edu.
Bluebook Citation
Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Keynote Address, Must a Faithful Judge Be a Faithless Judge?, 4 U. St. Thomas L.J. 157 (2006).
KEYNOTE ADDRESS 
MUST A FAITHFUL JUDGE BE A 
FAITHLESS JUDGE? 
DIARMUID F. O'SCANNLAIN* 
Thank you for that kind introduction. It is an honor to be asked to be 
the keynote speaker at this conference, which includes so many distin-
guished thinkers as panelists and participants. It is a special pleasure for me, 
as well, as I have the chance to be reunited with some old and esteemed 
friends. I look forward to making new ones in the course of our exchanges 
here. 
I should add that as a product and supporter of Catholic education 
myself-and I can assure you, having sent six of our eight children to Cath-
olic undergraduate institutions qualifies me as a supporter-it is a source of 
joy and indeed pride that the University of S1. Thomas has so quickly built a 
law school, which enjoys a fine reputation professionally, whose faculty 
and students are first rate, and whose halls are the home, as this conference 
attests, to a serious attempt to bring together faith and reason as people 
undertake the study of the law. 
I. 
One of the highlights of each year for me in chambers is the arrival of 
my new law clerks. In particular, I am fond of administering the oath of 
office required of individuals elected or appointed to civil service, as it em-
phasizes so well the task that we are about together. The oath, as we all 
know, includes the pledge to "support and defend the Constitution of the 
United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic" and it concludes 
with the sentence "So help me God."l Now, one way of characterizing the 
point of my reflections with you today, and my answer to the title of this 
talk, is to say that I refuse to believe that I should have greater confidence 
in law clerks who utter this oath believing that the last phrase is an empty 
* United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The 
views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my colleagues or of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. I would like to acknowledge, with 
thanks, the assistance of Rev. William R. Dailey, CSC, my law clerk. in preparing these remarks. 
l. 5 U.S.CA. § 3331 (1996). 
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intensifier than I have in those who actually invoke the help of the god in 
whom they believe. 
But to hear some of the shrill cries of "theocracy" these days, and 
some of the illogical attacks on people who bring their religious motivations 
to their public work, we should indeed imagine that a person's fitness for 
public service varies inversely with his or her sincerity in taking that oath of 
office. I hope it will not spoil the surprise for you if I say that, from my 
perspective, being a faithful judge-that is, one who takes seriously the 
classic judicial task of declaring what the law is irrespective of what he or 
she might hope the law would be-in no way requires that one be a faith-
less judge. 
Lest I be misunderstood, though it ought to go without saying, I should 
hasten to add that a part of the Constitution I am pleased to uphold is its 
prohibition against religious tests. I have sworn in law clerks of every faith 
and of no faith; I do not question the ability of those whose answers to life's 
profound questions differ profoundly from my own to undertake the judicial 
task faithfully. I might also clarify right up front that although I speak as a 
Catholic and a federal appellate judge, I do not speak for every Catholic, 
nor for every federal judge, nor for every Catholic circuit judge in what I 
am about to say. Nor do I wish to claim that there is not room for reasona-
ble disagreement among Catholics, judges, and Catholic judges about the 
relationship between faith and jurisprudence. 
In the time we have together I'd like to reflect upon the theological 
perspective of the Catholic tradition on the law and society, and to explain 
how I think that vision relates to the American legal system. One should not 
speak of faith and jurisprudence at the St. Thomas Law School without 
attending to the deep and lasting impact of Thomistic thought on what it is 
that we discuss here, and I shall try to suggest that the classical Catholic 
sources of legal thinking support the view that Catholics can be true to their 
faith and true to the law in our pluralistic democracy. 
After spending a bit of time attending to that foundation, I'd like to 
tum to some contemporary questions concerning faith in the public square 
generally and jurisprudence and faith in particular. I will explain why I am 
not persuaded by the suggestion that the vision of the judge that I propose is 
somehow a betrayal either of the Constitution or of one's own faith. 
II. 
As in so many areas of thought, one is well advised to begin one's 
thinking about the law with S1. Thomas Aquinas's own contributions to our 
understanding. The patron of this law school, in his Summa Theologica, laid 
out a Treatise on Law that continues to reward our attention. 2 
2. THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW (Stanley Parry, tmns., Gateway Ed., 1990). 
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From Aquinas we inherit an organized treatment of the nature of laws, 
including a taxonomy of laws relating four types of law: ftrst, of course, 
eternal law , the highest order of law pertaining to all reality-from the laws 
of physics to the moral law. 3 Human comprehension of eternal law pro-
gresses in accord with the progress of our knowledge in general. and is as 
limited as our knowledge in general. Natural law, on the other hand, is 
particular to humanity, consisting in rational principles of action knowable 
to reason. Human laws, which are derivative in ways more or less direct 
from eternal and natural law, are necessary both because human beings 
sometimes need the threat of punishment to follow through on the dictates 
of practical reason, but also and importantly because even a society of 
saints would need, say, traffic laws and rules of inheritance to order their 
affairs. Finally, because human beings are born into what he calls the "two-
fold darkness of sin and ignorance,"4 and therefore can have trouble dis-
cerning with clarity even what the natural law requires. we have divine law. 
revealed to aid us in reaching our ultimate goal. 
With these four categories in mind, we can see that within the Catholic 
tradition. law is not just a single box into which all things legal are thrown. 
It is worth noting, for our purposes, that the natural law, while central to 
Aquinas. is not the last word on law. The natural law does not define for us 
the job of a judge; it does not require that there be a Supreme Court or a 
court of appeals any more than it mandates the Securities and Exchange 
Commission or an NFL Commissioner. So the human law, of which the job 
of an appellate judge in our system is a creation, is necessary to understand-
ing the role of the judge, as well as the limitations of that role. 
And while it is certainly true that Aquinas was writing for a time and a 
place rather different from our own, just as striking as the differences be-
tween his era and ours is the ongoing relevance of the model of legal 
thought he advances in the Summa. As I noted, S1. Thomas found a need for 
human law not only in our need for motivation, but in the very nature of 
society itself. Indeed, as Aquinas puts it, following Augustine: "it is of the 
essence of a nation that the mutual relations of the citizens be ordered by 
just laws."5 Professor Robby George of Princeton rightly considers this pas-
sage to indicate that the rule of law is at the heart of Thomas's understand-
ing of law and of society. 
Without a doubt, the rule of law also shapes Thomas's understanding 
of the role of the judge. Later in the Summa, after the Treatise on Law and 
in his discussion of the virtues, Thomas engages in a thirteenth-century ver-
sion of our contemporary debates over textualism and purposivism. His 
3. ld. at 11-26. 
4. From St. Thomas's "Prayer Before Study": "Pour forth a ray of Your brightness into the 
darkened places of my mind; disperse from my soul the twofold darkness into which I was born: 
sin and ignorance ... " available at http://www.bostongrad.org/aquinas.htm. 
5. Supra note 2. 
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treatment, in his customary style of objections and replies, is not all that 
different from the mini-course in statutory interpretation that I have the 
pleasure of teaching each summer at NYU with Professor Bill Eskridge, 
come to think of it. At least, I can do no better in coming up with a bottom 
line than Aquinas's own statement of the role of the judge in light of a 
written text: "In these earthly laws," he says, "though lawmakers judge 
about them when they are making them, when once they are established and 
passed, the judges may judge no longer of them, but according to them."6 
In my chambers hangs a print of the well-known Hans Holbein portrait 
(present here in this hall as well) of another great St. Thomas, the very 
patron of lawyers, St. Thomas More. As his biographer R.W. Chambers 
relates, Lord Chancellor More once illustrated his devotion to the rule of 
law by declaring that, "were it my father stood on the one side, and the 
devil on the other, his cause being good, the devil should have right."7 
Clearly for More the judge, the devil's cause being right meant only his 
cause having the law on its side. Moral duty for this great saint of our 
Catholic tradition required him to separate, in his duties as judge, his 
knowledge of the law from his knowledge of morality. 
As Judge Robert Bork once noted, the playwright Robert Bolt got 
More "remarkably right" in this regard.8 Judge Bork was recalling Bolt's 
portrayal of More explaining to his daughter, Margaret, why he would not 
arrest his betrayer Richard Rich. Margaret and her husband William Roper 
pointed out that while Rich may not have broken any of England's laws, he 
had broken God's law. Bolt's More in reply avers: 
Then God can arrest him .... The law, Roper, the law. I know 
what's legal, not what's right. And I'll stick to What's legal. I'm 
not God. The currents and eddies of what's right and wrong, 
which you find such plain sailing, I can't navigate. I'm no voy-
ager. But in the thickets of the law, oh, there I'm a forester.9 
I won't claim to be quite the forester that Judge More surely was, al-
though I will note that however tangled the thicket of English law may have 
been, he did not have to contend with the undergrowth of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's precedents! In any event, suffice it to say that I can do no better to 
uphold his ideal than to remind myself when I glance at his portrait that, 
despite the considerable authority entrusted to me as a United States Circuit 
Judge, I'm not God either. 
I hope you will forgive me for spending so much time on my Catholic 
forebears in laying out my thoughts on faith and jurisprudence. But I want 
6. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Part II of the Second Part, q. 60 a. 5, available 
at http://www.newadvent.org/summal306005.htm. 
7. Quoted in Robert Bork, Thomas More jor Our Season, FIRST THINGS, June/July 1999, 
available at http://www.frrstthings.comlftissues/ft9906/articleslbork.html. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
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to make clear that those of us who subscribe to what has come to be called 
"conservative" jurisprudence did not invent this approach to law out of 
whole cloth in response to contemporary "liberal" jurisprudence. The roots 
of a role for judges more akin to the "umpire" in Chief Justice Roberts's 
now familiar analogy than to the moral philosopher, Hercules, who is the 
hero of Professor Dworkin's theorizing, are deep in the history and thought 
of the legal and intellectual tradition that I consider home.1O And I should 
note that my intellectual home is not exclusively within the Catholic tradi-
tion. For though I am a proud graduate of St. John's University-the great 
school in Queens, as opposed to the great school in Collegeville-I can also 
say that what I learned at Harvard Law School in the early 1960s was closer 
to Aquinas and Augustine than what I fear one might be learning there 
today. 
III. 
It is important in this context to affirm my belief that a modest role for 
judges, a rejection of the idea that judges possess the very mind of God, is 
at the heart of my faith tradition's understanding of the law. So in a sense, 
though this is perhaps not the time to say so, I'm not a great choice to be the 
keynote speaker of a conference such as this. Because as I understand what 
my faith tradition teaches me about jurisprudence, it amounts to the most 
unexciting and non-threatening jurisprudence one can imagine: one com-
mitted to the rule of law. The notion of the rule of law, rather than of 
judges, is nonthreatening in just the way that Alexander Hamilton suggested 
it ought to be when he called the judiciary the "least dangerous" branch in 
Federalist 78. 11 If we have the rule of law, rather than of judges, then the 
faith of the judge should not matter much. 
Such a vision is not only nonthreatening-it is reassuring. For just as 
Aquinas held the rule of law to be of the essence of society, I would note 
that a modest vision of the judiciary's role is crucial to the securing of 
liberty. The very notion of ordered liberty assumes that the rule of law is 
part and parcel of securing the blessings of freedom. Sadly, our current 
experience of trying to build democracy in Iraq gives us a daily reminder of 
the ways in which the breakdown of law threatens liberty and indeed life 
itself. Two crucial elements of the ordering of liberty in our system are 
relevant to our topic today: the separation of powers and the separation of 
church and state. 
I mentioned earlier that in addition to being nonthreatening, the vision 
of faith and jurisprudence that I have to offer is not all that exciting. By this 
10. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice 
of the U.S., Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Congo 55-57 (2005) (statement of John Roberts, nomi-
nee to be Chief Justice, Supreme Court); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 239-40 (Belknap 
Press 1986). 
II. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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I mean to dispel the seemingly increasingly prevalent fear that the faithful-
ness of so many in our democracy is among the greatest of current threats to 
our democracy. A selection of recent book titles should suffice to demon-
strate what I have in mind: The Baptizing of America: The Religious Right's 
Plans for the Rest of Us; American Theocracy: The Peril and Politics of 
Radical Religion, Oil, and Borrowed Money in the 21st Century; and The 
Theocons: Secular America Under Siege. 12 Now, what these titles have in 
common is that they are undeniably exciting. To read them is to learn that 
theocracy is upon us, that religious conservatives are plotting to change 
things for the rest of us, and that parts of the nation are apparently under 
siege. 
I think it is apparent from my own remarks that at least as far as I 
understand my own faith tradition it does not require, and indeed it would 
not pennit, my participating in any such siege. I believe there are a variety 
of erroneous assumptions at work in these warnings about a growing theo-
cratic movement, but today I limit myself to noting that nobody should be 
threatened by the fact that many judges are people of faith. 
IV. 
I said at the outset that I do not pretend here today to speak for all 
Catholics or all judges. Indeed, just three years ago at this law school, one 
of my Ninth Circuit colleagues, Judge Stephen Reinhardt, suggested that 
the kind of vision that I have laid out here divorces "justice from the worka-
day vision of the judiciary,"13 and praised our Catholic colleague and dear 
friend Judge John Noonan for bringing a "passion for social justice for ordi-
nary people" to his work on the bench.14 I do not quarrel with Judge Rein-
hardt for praising Judge Noonan, who is without question a giant of the 
legal profession as well as one of the major figures in American Catholic 
thought in the last half century. 
But I would take a few moments respectfully to disagree with the vi-
sion of jurisprudence that Judge Reinhardt laid out in his remarks here. He 
described the task of the judge in relation to a very abstract notion of the 
law as "a means to an end . . . to ensure freedom and liberty and to help 
provide a decent life for all Americans."15 Now that is all well cptd good, 
except of course that it does not answer the question we are truly interested 
in-what is the judge's role in pursuing that end-except perhaps in a ques-
tion-begging way. 
12. See generally Ross Douthat, Theocracy, Theocracy, Theocracy, FIRST THINGS, Aug.! 
Sept. 2006, available at http://www.firstthings.comlftissues/ft0607/artic1es/douthat.html. 
13. Stephen Reinhardt, The Role of Social Justice in Judging Cases, 1 U. St. Thomas L.l. 18, 
19 (2003). 
14. [d. at 18. 
15. [d. at 18-19. 
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I have suggested that the primary role of the judge in our system is to 
uphold the rule of law, even when the law he or she must uphold does not 
seem wise or even just. Judge Reinhardt's speech acknowledged that the 
separation of powers was "undoubtedly an important feature of our repub-
lic" but then tried to minimize its importance in securing the justice our 
Constitution aims at establishing. 16 Far more prominent in his remarks was 
the "Constitution's capacity for evolution," a process apparently guided not 
by democratic action but judicial fiat. 17 This was exemplified, Judge Rein-
hardt reminded us, by the Warren-Brennan Court, which refused to "wait on 
the sidelines" while the other institutions of government lagged behind. 18 
Apparently my Article III commission means I evolve faster than the rest of 
you! 
Let's think about those two aspects of Judge Reinhardt's jurispru-
dence: the evolving Constitution and the judiciary's impatience with what 
we sometimes call the political branches. It acknowledges that some of 
Judge Reinhardt's readings of the Constitution depart from the understand-
ing of its authors-or else it has not evolved. And it acknowledges that 
some of those readings are not the views voted upon by our fellow citizens. 
Now, let me assure you-Judge Reinhardt is definitely a brilliant man and 
one who strives to uphold his vision of justice, good qualities both. And 
doubtless, there are moral views that he has and I would share that we think 
superior to those of the original Constitution, and perhaps even superior to 
those of our fellow citizens. What I have trouble seeing is what entitles 
Judge Reinhardt or Judge O'Scannlain to declare his own sincerely held 
views to be law when neither his predecessors nor his contemporaries have 
enacted them. 
Finally, Judge Reinhardt suggested that a "more expansive view of the 
judicial function will often reach an outcome ... more sympathetic to . . . 
the person in need."19 He illustrated his point by reference to a case in 
which he accused his colleagues of "compassionless conservatism."20 
With all due respect to my eminent colleague, his description of the 
judge's role suffers from two basic analytical mistakes. As I hope I have 
shown, our system does not view the separation of powers as somehow 
opposing justice; it is, rather, essential to it, in virtue of its contribution to 
the rule of law. Suggesting that the separation of powers is somehow in 
conflict with the Constitution's pursuit of justice is the first mistake. The 
second is the idea that the judge ought to pit compassion against the rule of 
law. The idea of compassion only makes sense against a background of 
16. ld. at 20. 
17. ld. at 21. 
18. ld. at 22. 
19. ld. at 25. 
20. See Gradilla v. Ruskin Mfg., 320 F.3d 951, 960 (9th Cir. 2003) (Reinhardt, I., 
dissenting) . 
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justice. This is clear theologically in the Christian tradition: God's mercy 
toward sinners does not obliterate the category of sin. It is the sin of pre-
sumption to imagine that because God is merciful I can abrogate his com-
mands. Similarly, while there is allowance in our system for the exercise of 
discretion, it does not fall to the judge to second guess the lawgiver in order 
to bring about the judge's vision of justice or to exercise the judge's under-
standing of compassion, except where such discretion has been expressly 
delegated. 
Nobody would suggest, I hope, that a police officer should suppress 
evidence of a crime committed by an immigrant because he regards our 
removal laws as draconian. Similarly, while a prosecutor has the discretion 
not to bring a case to trial, if a judge thinks that discretion ought to have 
been exercised in a given case before her, she is not free therefore to exer-
cise partiality in favor of the defendant in adjudicating the case. No more 
am I free, as an appellate judge, to import my substantive views about how 
the law ought to be in the name of sympathy or compassion. 
Moreover, I see no justification in our system of law for the presump-
tion that my views are superior to those of the legislature. Certainly I often 
believe they are, but the way for me to act upon that belief is to vote for 
candidates who represent my views. It is not permitted to me to search for 
or to invent "ambiguities" in the law in order to correct what I perceive to 
be its deficiencies. Make no mistake about it, like every judge, I am capable 
of misinterpreting the texts before me. But I am well persuaded that com-
passion, about which I am also occasionally mistaken, does not require me 
to "expand" my role in the legal system. 
There are many areas of law, as we all know, that fall short of a perfect 
vision of justice within the Catholic tradition. Let us assume for the sake of 
argument that a Catholic feels passionately about the rights of the unborn or 
of immigrants, and that our nation's laws are unjust to both. There are many 
commendable jobs a person might pursue in order to vindicate those posi-
tions. But I respectfully suggest that the job of federal circuit judge is not 
high on the list. A person wanting the sort of job that can improve the 
justice of our laws ought to be running for office, writing for a think tank, 
or working in some other sort of advocacy role. Accepting a commission to 
the federal bench means agreeing to enforce the laws as they are, not as one 
would have them be. 
In his first encyclical, Deus Caritas Est, Pope Benedict XVI wrote of 
the Church that "[s]he has to play her part through rational argument and 
she has to reawaken the spiritual energy without which justice, which al-
ways demands sacrifice, cannot prevail and prosper," but he continued that 
"[a] just society must be the achievement of politics, not of the Church."21 
21. Available at http://www.vatican.va/holy _fatherlbenediccxvi/encyclicalsidocumentslhL 
ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est_en.htmL 
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In our political system, substantive improvements to the social order are 
brought about by legislators, not federal appellate judges. The fact that the 
Constitution is ordered toward justice, as Judge Reinhardt noted, does not 
mean that the federal judiciary has a blanket commission to "do good and 
avoid evil" as our own consciences would dictate. As Professor Henry 
Monaghan once wisely reminded us, ours is not a perfect Constitution, and 
taking the oath to uphold it is not taking an oath to impose one's vision of 
perfection from the bench.22 Nor is mine a perfect conscience, I might add. 
And so I will continue to suggest that we federal judges limit ourselves to 
legal arguments when deciding cases, where there will be room enough for 
disagreement. 
v. 
In conclusion, I hope to have shown today how a traditional under-
standing of the law within Catholic thought can shape a jurisprudence that 
is consistent with our American political system and the role of the judge 
within it. I have also tried to show that other conceptions of jurisprudence, 
whether related to any faith or no faith, are a greater threat to the design of 
that system than the fact that many judges are also people of faith. And I 
trust that along the way I may have said something to provoke a question or 
two, which I'm happy to take some time to answer now. Thank you. 
22. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (1981). 
